Staggering numbers and visible presence aside, HROs are widely viewed as the critical link in improving a state's human rights performance. HRO activities direct international media attention towards a targeted state, encouraging external pressure to improve its human rights record (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . They also provide the tools, attention, and support domestic populations need to protest against a repressive state themselves (Risse and Ropp 1999) . HROs often train and inform domestic populations of the utility of non-violent protest strategies, encouraging individuals to drop their arms and protest peacefully (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008) . Despite this classic theoretical view of the importance of HROs, very few empirical studies systematically examine the impact of these organizations on state-dissident relations. In this paper, we map out the effects of 1 An NGO is minimally defined as any non-profit, non-governmental, legal, voluntary organization (Yearbook of International Organizations, a standard NGO reference). For the purposes of this project, we focus on international NGOs (INGOs) with active members in at least 3 states and an expressed interest in human rights (UIA 2008 (UIA /2009 Consistent with existing scholarship, we argue that increased HRO activities expand resources for new and existing protest movements, leading to higher levels of domestic non-violent protest. In addition, we argue that increases in HRO activities initiate diffusion mechanisms that also lead to higher levels of violent domestic protest against a state. Further, we hypothesize that the impact of HROs on domestic protest varies by the type of activities the organizations are conducting within a state. These activities, such as criticizing a repressive regime or setting up a permanent office structure, signify varying levels of commitment to a domestic population. When
HROs have a permanent presence within a state, the greatest level of commitment, they have the most salient impact on domestic protest. This is in comparison to circumstances where HROs have some local volunteers within the target state or where they only remotely target the state ("naming and shaming" or "shaming and blaming") from abroad.
Utilizing two new datasets, one on nonviolent and violent anti-government protest and one on the activities of over 400 HROs throughout the world, we test these propositions quantitatively.
We find that increases in some HRO activities have a positive impact on domestic non-violent protest behavior. This is a heretofore unexamined link that flows from Keck and Sikkink's (1998) transnational advocacy network framework. Moreover, we find strong support for our hypothesized linkage between increases in certain high commitment HRO activities and greater levels of domestic violent protest.
This paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, we present a highly nuanced picture of HRO motivations and activities. We highlight the varying levels of commitment inherent in these different HRO activities and their disparate consequences for domestic politics, adding to the growing cross-disciplinary literature on HROs/INGOs. We bridge the literatures on HRO activity and political protest, presenting unique theoretical explanations for the effects of HRO activity across violent and nonviolent forms of protest.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we present the relevant literature and our central argument connecting HRO activity with violent and nonviolent political protest. Next, we outline our research design and methodology. We then discuss the empirical results and the substantive significance of these results. Finally, we conclude with the implications of these findings for existing theory and future work on HROs/INGOs and political protest.
Background & Theory

The Dominant Theoretical Framework on HROs/INGOs
The transnational advocacy network (hereafter TAN) framework centers on the role that HROs and other INGOs play in strengthening advocacy attempts and pressuring states to change behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999) . As Keck and Sikkink (1998) (Keck and Sikkink 1998:12) .
Critiques to the Dominant Framework on HROs/INGOs
Though the TAN framework is useful at understanding the process by which INGOs aid overall advocacy attempts, the assumptions underlying the TAN framework have been criticized on many fronts (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Carpenter 2007; Murdie 2009 ). Most strikingly, according to the TAN framework, INGOs are assumed to be motivated by "values rather than material concerns" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2) . This is a strong assumption, as much of political science assumes that all actors are self-interested and not wholly altruistic (Fearon 1995) .
Moreover, the pure altruism assumption contradicts many accounts of what INGOs are actually doing on the ground (Clark et al. 2006; Sundstrom 2006; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008) .
Instead of trying to assist all domestic populations in their struggles against an obdurate regime, there is often a "donor dominance" that occurs with INGOs, where these organizations are motivated by material motives, prioritizing the concerns and interests of their Western donors above mission-related altruistic motives (Grant and Keohane 2005; Murdie 2009 (Klees 1998; Bob 2005 ).
Developing a Theory of the Impact of HROs on Domestic Protest
We use these critiques of the TAN's altruism assumption as a springboard from which to examine the impact of HROs on domestic protest. We view both HROs and domestic groups as strategic and self-interested, looking to maximize their gains at the least cost possible. While we concentrate on the direct relationship between domestic groups and HROs, we recognize that this interaction takes place in a larger, more complex political setting that includes the state and its decision making calculus.
HROs and Domestic Protest Groups: What do they do?
Domestic groups and HROs typically share a common goal: change in a state's policy or behavior. Domestic protest groups seek to influence state behavior across a gamut of issue areas, ranging from the protection of civil liberties or wage related concerns to demanding greater autonomy from the state. In the pursuit of these goals, they employ two main types of strategies: nonviolent protest and violent protest. Nonviolent domestic protest includes all claims made by domestic groups against a government in an organized, active manner, without the threat or use of force (Schock 2005; Bhasin 2008 ). These actions would include activities such as strikes, demonstrations and rallies. Conversely, violent domestic protest includes the threat or use of force directed at state offices or agents, such as a physical assault against a government official or the bombing of a government office. We argue that domestic groups seek to maximize their utility and choose the strategy best suited to achieve these goals.
HROs too have different strategies with which they attempt to influence state behavior.
HROs themselves, however, have "no direct ability to change policy" or behavior (Schepers 2006: 283 Most commonly, HROs use a strategy of careful targeting of state actors, often termed "shaming and blaming" or "naming and shaming" (Schmitz 2002) . Through these tactics, HROs attempt to influence third party states and intergovernmental organizations (hereafter IGOs) to assist in pressuring a target-state from above (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999) . This tactic can occur both from within a state and, more frequently, remotely from beyond the targeted state. For example, Amnesty International often targets repressive states with news releases issued from either its London or New York City based locations (Hopgood 2006; Murdie 2009 ). This strategy, utilizing remote shaming and blaming, reflects the lowest level of commitment from the HROs towards the affected domestic population in the target state. Since "shaming and blaming" is typically completely external, it can be essential in getting IGOs and third-party states involved but might not even be known to the repressed domestic population.
A second strategy, involving some direct engagement with local populations in the target state, occurs when the HRO sends volunteers to a country or works to build a local membership base (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . Through locally-based volunteers or members, HROs work to change domestic attitudes, gather and provide information, and increase domestic pressure on a regime (Korey 1998) . These local representatives serve as conduits for resources provided by HROs, including the latest information about government atrocities and assistance to local groups already engaged in pressuring their governments for better protection of human rights.
The highest level of commitment to a domestic population is reflected in another common strategy of HROs: setting up of a permanent office within a state. The permanent office often comes with the commitment of a number of full-time staff and volunteers who are designated resources by the HRO to be used in the country (Okafor 2006) . The HRO office serves as a central point for distributing information, education, and training resources to local groups. The HRO may also be central to the building and expanding of networks of local groups, across issue areas, within a state (Bartley 2007) . By setting up a permanent office, the HRO is best able to establish long term partnerships with domestic groups, start educational programs, and influence policy making (Hopgood 2006; Okafor 2006 ).
HROs and domestic protest groups often rely on each other's support. For domestic populations and protest groups on the ground, HROs are repositories with resources of great value.
These may include direct funding to help the domestic protest group in expanding its organizational capabilities and access to media attention and the "brand name" of the HRO, potentially softening the state's repressive response in the protest group's favor (Bob 2005) . Additional resources include training of local activists and increasing their contact to other groups and advocacy actors within a specific network. HROs may inform domestic groups of additional protest tactics that have proved effective against repressive states in other circumstances.
On the other hand, HROs with offices in foreign locations and those without extensive local experience may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic population (Sundstrom 2006; Murdie 2009 ). Partnering with domestic protest groups provides HROs legitimacy on the ground and can aid in enhancing the HRO's image and influence on a regime's policies and behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . This symbiotic relationship between HROs and domestic protest groups was identified as critical to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa: HROs provided international attention, skills and resources to domestic protest groups, who aided in expanding the legitimacy and place for HROs within the state (Taylor 2002) . Further, as the practitioner literature has highlighted, HROs often depend on the support of domestic groups to justify and attract greater funding from international donors (Clark et al. 2006 ).
HRO Activity -Effects on Nonviolent and Violent Protest
Our theoretical argument builds on an existing literature that links broader civil society actions to ethnic group protests (Olzak and Tsutstui 1998; Tsutsui 2004; Olzak 2006 
HRO Activity and Resource Based Mobilization of Nonviolent Protest Groups
HROs direct greater resources to moderate groups adopting nonviolent strategies than more radical groups, particularly those utilizing violent strategies. This selective process of support is called the radical flank effect, first highlighted in Herbert Haines ' (1984) work on the civil rights movement in the United States. Haines (1984) and others since have found that foundations and
INGOs looking to support grassroots movements were selective in their support of domestic groups, supporting only those they saw as legitimate. This led to greater support for moderate groups, who were encouraged to dominate the movement, over radical groups (Oliver and Myers 2002; Haines 2006) . As a result, moderate groups pursuing nonviolent strategies garner greater resources due to their selective support from larger organizations. This finding applies well to the realm of human rights. As highlighted before, foundations and donors control the agenda and strategies of HROs.
Self-interested HROs, looking to maintain a stable flow of resources, are constrained by the concerns of large Western donors and, by extension, their preferences for supporting groups using nonviolent means. Thus HROs would seek to distance themselves from more radical and violent groups.
Further, both HROs and domestic protest groups share material concerns: to maintain and increase resources to best achieve their shared goals. Domestic groups are made aware of these 
HRO Activity and Diffusion Based Mobilization of Violent Protest Groups
At the outset, the causal relationship between increased HRO activity and violent domestic protest is more complex. On one hand, as described above, domestic protest groups are encouraged to switch their strategies from violent to nonviolent ones based on fears of disruption in funding and the new promise of support provided from HROs encouraging nonviolent tactics (Berkovitch and Gordon 2008) . While this would lead us to believe that increased HRO activities would lead to an overall decrease in the use of domestic violent protest, more recent accounts of broader social movements, including the civil rights movement (Haines 2006) A more compelling explanation for the positive effects of HRO activities on violent protest, however relies on protest diffusion mechanisms (Haines 1984 ). As highlighted above, violent and nonviolent protest groups operate in the same political arena and often share the same political goals. There is value in recognizing the self-interested desire for nonviolent groups to distinguish themselves as more effective (Schock 2005 ) and more legitimate to attract greater funding (Haines 1986 Scholars studying the effects of local media coverage on protest mobilization point to links between greater local attention and a greater number of protest events, (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Bartley 2007 ) particularly violent protest events (Myers 2000; Koopmans and Olzak 2004) . Domestic groups, through paying attention to information on protest events initiated in nearby cities or districts, are likely to be inspired to initiate protest actions themselves. Kern (2008) finds that international news coverage has no significant effect on local domestic protest mobilization in East Germany; instead, it is the local attention to protest activities that leads to increased domestic protest events.
Connecting these processes, we argue that the working of the local media attention diffusion process, described above, hinges upon the HRO having some local presence in the target state. This local diffusion process would not work through remote shaming and blaming activities of HROs.
International shaming and blaming in foreign locations may or may not reach domestic groups involved in protest activities on the ground; this attention is often closely controlled domestically by target states with less than positive human rights records (Kern 2008) .
HROs with some local presence, however, are likely to have two advantages that affect local diffusion processes. First, they are likely to have more detailed and reliable information about recent protest activities by domestic groups and repressive actions taken by target governments, one of the key services HROs provide (Haines 2006) . Second, HROs with some local presence are in the unique position to utilize their international "brand name" (Bob 2005 ) and ties to local advocacy networks to disseminate information and mobilize new violent protest events through this local media attention diffusion mechanism.
The second diffusion mechanism relies on a related and potentially more important causal link between HROs and violent protest: field-building activities. Field-building activities include any action taken within a local context to connect the large "field" of relevant advocacy movement actors (Bartley 2007) . Field-building activities of INGOs connect a wide network of actors on the ground, across issue areas, ideologies, and preferences for strategy, all united for a common cause.
This implies that HROs, while perhaps preferring to support nonviolent groups over violent ones, would be realistically engaging in activities that support a wide range of actors and strategies, not just those relegated to the institutionalized or nonviolent realm alone (Haines 2006; Bartley 2007 ).
As Clarke (1998) highlights, HROs and other international NGOs "often mobilize sectors already organized and politically active" (208). In the field-building literature, the emphasis is on
INGOs, including HROs, increasing interaction between domestic groups on the ground, creating more complex and dense networks of actors who adhere to a variety of principles and strategies (Haines 2006; Bartley 2007) . It follows that the informational and material resources provided by HROs could be used by any organized domestic group, even groups that use violent protest strategies. Thus, increases in HRO activities may lead to direct and unintended positive effects on levels of domestic violent protests.
Finally, HROs may also have direct intended effects on violent protest. Specifically, HROs are often concerned with gaining international donations and appearing effective to donors.
Therefore, in some cases, HROs may support violent domestic protest simply because the attention that violent protests can bring are effective for completing a "boomerang" pattern of international advocacy. In addition, these HROs may recognize violent protest as an effective strategy for gaining greater world media attention and their own self-motivated financial goals (Bob 2005 
Varying Levels of HRO Commitment and Domestic Nonviolent and Violent Protest
The causal connections between HROs and domestic anti-governmental protest depend, as outlined above, on the radical plank effect and resource mobilization, for nonviolent protest, and local media attention and field-building diffusion processes, for violent protest. Further, we argue that these processes are not present in all HRO activities; instead, these causal processes depend on HRO activities that reflect a high level of commitment to the local population.
While practitioners have recognized a variety of strategies employed by HROs, there is limited theoretical attention paid to how these activities differ in their effects on domestic politics.
We argue that the common strategies of HROs (remote shaming and blaming, local membership base, and permanent office location) reflect varying levels of commitment to the local population and, thus, have different levels of influence on domestic protest, both violent and nonviolent. As mentioned, domestic protest groups utilize many resources from HROs, including funding, information, protest training, and increased network contacts with other actors in the field.
However, these resources are unlikely to be provided through remote shaming and blaming, activities at the lowest level of HRO commitment, which applies international pressure from abroad (Risse and Ropp 1999) . Although remote shaming and blaming may indirectly benefit domestic protest groups through later improved human rights records, it does not have the radical plank and resource mobilization effects necessary at the domestic level to lead to direct increases in domestic nonviolent protest against a state.
As argued above, local media attention and field-building are crucial in mobilizing domestic protest groups, leading to a diffusion effect from nonviolent to violent protest. Because remote shaming and blaming activities are geared towards international media attention, it follows that they do not provide the local information transmission necessary for an effect on violent domestic protest. Likewise, without a local presence, it is unlikely that remote shaming and blaming will provide any field-building effects. Therefore, remote shaming and blaming activities by HROs are posited to have no direct influence on domestic nonviolent or violent protest.
Conversely, we argue that increases in HRO activities with greater levels of commitment to the domestic population, reflected either through a local membership base or through a permanent office location, have direct effects on domestic nonviolent and violent protest. A local presence can be crucial in providing the resources necessary for the direct mobilization of domestic nonviolent protest groups. A local membership or volunteer base is also likely to catalyze the protest diffusion mechanisms necessary for effects on violent protest. Therefore, increases in HRO local membership bases are likely to be associated with more violent and nonviolent protest activities. Based on these arguments, we present the following two hypotheses: 
Empirical Analysis
To examine the validity of the hypotheses outlined above, concerning the effects of HROs on domestic protest activities, we use new panel data on the various activities of over 400 HROs and a nuanced dataset on domestic anti-state protest activities from 1990 to 2004. This is the available time period in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) framework that informs both the HRO and protest data utilized in this study (Bond et al 2003) . When our new data was combined with necessary controls, we had a sample of roughly 130 states for a total of around 1400 country-year observations. 5 In this section, we outline the novel ways in which we capture the activities of domestic protest groups and HROs and the model specifications used to test each hypothesis.
Data on Protest Activities
The dependent variables needed for each hypothesis must capture domestic protest activities against a state and these must be separated into nonviolent and violent subcategories. This data is organized in a "who" did "what" to "whom" manner for each particular event, over 10 million events in the complete dataset (King and Lowe 2003 Tables of all the types of events included as either violent or nonviolent protest and summary statistics are in an online appendix.
7 A possible explanation for the high number of domestic violent protest events, as compared to nonviolent protest events, is due to news media focusing on violent events (Earl et. al 2004) . This bias towards more violent events in the dataset does not influence the conclusions drawn from this research for a variety of reasons. First, we examine the effects on both violent and nonviolent protest events separately. Second, we control for both overall country coverage in the dataset and for the alternative type of protest, as discussed below. Finally, our results are consistent with findings using alternative measures of the dependent variable, including Banks (2008) data. It is worth noting, however, that the Banks (2008) protest data which is also based on a news source, the New York Times, also has a higher number of total violent protest events than nonviolent events during the time period used in this study. 
Data on HRO Activities
Though conceptually it is clear that the activities of HROs are important for a variety of Given our theoretical argument, we restrict our attention to only INGOs with a human rights focus (HROs). However, we still capture the activities of more than just one HRO. Further, we argue above that not all activities of HROs have the same effect on protest. To capture these differences in activities, we rely on newly created data on the three common types of HRO activities: HRO Events, HRO Memberships/Volunteers, and HRO Permanent Locations. This procedure produced around 10,000 distinct events, aggregated at the country-year level. Finally, for each of these variables on HRO activities, reflecting the concepts central to our causal mechanisms, we utilize annual change in HRO activities and not raw levels as the key independent variables in our analyses. 10 Using annual change in these counts allows us to capture the theoretical idea that increases in the levels of HRO activity, not the levels of activity themselves, lead to higher levels of domestic protest. In other words, it reflects the idea of campaigning efforts by HROs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hopgood 2006) . As mentioned in the theoretical section, HROs are connected to domestic protest through resource mobilization and protest diffusion mechanisms; concentrated increases in HRO activity would be needed to set off these mechanisms. By utilizing annual change, our measures of HRO activities account for this dynamic.
HRO Events
HRO Membership / Volunteer
Statistical Controls
Previous research has shown a wide variety of factors that could have a confounding influence with HRO activity and need to be controlled for in all statistical models. First, we use
Lagged values of the dependent variables to account for any time-dependency. Second, we control for the natural log of Population, accounting for any impact a larger population has on domestic protest levels (WDI 2008) . Reflecting the idea that it isn't the total population that influences protest levels as much as it is the politically active segment of the population, we also include as a control the percentage of the Population from 15-64 (WDI 2008) . Economic development has also 10 Main results as to HRO events are robust if levels of HRO activities are used instead of annual change; results as to HRO membership /volunteers are close to accepted levels of statistical level and in the expected direction. Worth noting, raw levels cannot be used on the HRO permanent location variable due to nonstationarity; using annual change does make this variable stationary and suitable for statistical analysis. Results using raw levels are reported in the Online Appendix.
been linked to protest activities (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002 There are also many studies linking consolidated democracy to repression and protest (Poe and Tate 1994; Cingranelli and Richards 1999) . Given this established relationship, we include a binary control for whether a country is a Democracy, defined as an annual Polity democracy score of 6 or greater (Marshall and Jaggers 2007) . Other studies have found connections between protest and democratization; many contend that "anocracies" are more likely than democracies or dictatorships to have protest activities (Schock 1996; Allen 2008) . To account for the effect of democratization, therefore, we included as a control a measure of Consolidated Institutions, calculated as the square of the state's annual Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2007) . We account for the relationship between protest and war by including a dichotomous variable for the presence of civil or international War within the state. This variable was taken from the by UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Databank (2008).
To account for any disparity due to varying news coverage of countries, we explicitly control for the Total Coverage in IDEA (ln), a count of total domestic events reported in the IDEA database for the country in that year, in all statistical models where the protest dependent variables are from IDEA. Finally, in all models, we account for whether the existence of nonviolent protest encourages violent protest and for whether the existence of violent protest encourages nonviolent protest by including the Alternative Protest Count as a control. 
Empirical Models
Our hypotheses imply that the impact of HRO activities on domestic protest will vary as a function of the type of HRO activity. We also suggest different causal mechanisms linking increased HRO activity with violent versus nonviolent protest. Therefore, there are three statistical models, one for each type of HRO activity -remote shaming and blaming, local membership and permanent locations: Because of the count nature of the dependent variables, it is necessary to use methods appropriate for event-count data. Due to the evidence of positive contagion, we utilize a negative binomial model with robust standard errors (King 1989) . 12 Additionally, because we focus theoretically on the impact of increasing HRO activity on improving the ability of protest groups to protest in the future, we measure the dependent variable at t+1 and the independent variables at t. In other words, the statistical models utilize lagged independent variables or can be thought of as measuring the impact of increasing HRO activities in the previous year on domestic protest activities in the current year. This operationalization reflects other recent work on domestic protest ( Further, HROs and domestic groups appear to be in a symbiotic relationship, both encouraging the activities of the other. Because our research questions revolve around the impact of HROs on domestic protest, we devote careful attention to potential reverse causality. First, we measure our independent variables one year prior to our dependent variable, ensuring that HRO activity (cause) precedes changes in protest (effect). Second, we explicitly tested for endogeneity using instruments from sociology on the spread of INGOs. Importantly, our key independent variable specifications did not emerge as endogenous to domestic protest activities. 13 Therefore, we are confident in our findings a hurdle negative binomial model with robust standard errors. These results were in line statistically and substantively with the results provided here and can be found in an Online Appendix.
Results and Analysis
Our hypotheses are supported in the analyses, as show in Tables 1-3 Below, we outline these results and discuss the substantive effects of our findings. We divide this discussion into two parts, the first part outlines the effects of HRO activities reflecting a low level of commitment (remote shaming and blaming in Model 1) on nonviolent and violent protest events and the second section discusses how increases in HRO activities reflecting a higher level of commitment (local membership in Model 2 and permanent locations in Model 3) have on nonviolent and violent protest events.
[Insert Table 1 Here] theoretically exogenous to protests yet still causally linked to increases in HRO activities, but are statistically established as such using conventional tests (Woolridge 2002). This supports our general argument that these remote shaming and blaming activities, because they do not result in resource mobilization at the domestic level, have little impact on local domestic protest groups. These "shaming and blaming" activities, while frequently emphasized in the HRO literature, demonstrate a low level of commitment to the domestic population. Any leverage gained through international media attention has been argued to have little impact on domestic protest activities (Kern 2008) . The lack of local presence implies weak links to the local community and limited or no provision of the direct resources that we highlight in the resource mobilization and protest diffusion casual mechanisms. These results highlight the limitations of remote shaming and blaming by HROs and donors (An-Na'im 2002; Hafner-Burton 2008 [Insert Table 2 Here]
Empirical Results Concerning Low Levels of HRO Commitment
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Empirical Results Concerning Higher Levels of HRO Commitment
The type of commitment matters for levels of domestic violent and nonviolent protest. As highlighted in Table 1 , increases in remote shaming and blaming had no influence on domestic protest activities. In comparison, we find that increases in the local presence of HROs do matter for both violent and nonviolent protest. does matter for domestic protest but its impact may be less reliable, depending on the source of local membership and its impact on the HRO-local population linkage.
Finally, the greatest level of commitment to a domestic population, seen in an increase in HRO permanent locations, was argued to have the strongest theoretical link with increases in nonviolent and violent protest activities (Hypothesis 3a). This is very well supported by the results of Model 3, seen in Table 3 , where HRO Permanent Location (annual change) is the key independent variable. As seen, this variable is significant and in the positive direction for both violent and nonviolent protest, regardless if captured by the IDEA dataset or Banks (2008) . This is consistent with our underlying argument that the level of commitment matters for the impact HRO activities have on domestic protest. Further, it demonstrates the logic of our causal mechanisms that information, training and financial resources provided by HROs (resource mobilization and local media attention) are best distributed through these permanent offices. These permanent offices are also best equipped to provide network contacts and organizational help (field-building) to domestic groups that benefit both domestic violent and nonviolent protest activities, a significant departure from the dominant HRO literature that stresses the influence of HROs on domestic nonviolent protest alone. with a 95% confidence interval from 0.09 to 0.49).
These substantively large and robust results support our hypotheses regarding positive effects of increases in the local presence of HROs on violent and nonviolent protests (Hypothesis 1-2, 3b) with the strongest impact being associated with increases in HRO permanent office locations (Hypothesis 3a), reflecting the highest level of commitment, on nonviolent and violent domestic protest.
Conclusion
This study was theoretically motivated by the scant attention paid to the influence HROs There are several important theoretical and empirical contributions made by this paper.
Theoretically, we present causal mechanisms that directly link HRO activity to both nonviolent and violent forms of protest, the latter is a unique expectation, counterintuitive to the existing views of HRO behavior and borne out by our strong empirical results.
Our most significant theoretical innovation is in highlighting that the type of HRO activity matters for domestic violent and nonviolent protest activities. We argue that HRO activities involving some local presence signify greater levels of commitment to a local population than those activities carried out remotely from foreign offices. These activities involving local membership and permanent locations have the strongest links to domestic populations, providing direct resources and sparking protest diffusion mechanisms that result in higher levels of violent and nonviolent domestic protest against a state. We find strong empirical support for this theoretical innovation: the type of HRO activity has a bearing on its impact on domestic protest. Future work that differentiates between various types of HRO/INGO activity seems necessary. These findings also support calls by human rights advocates for HROs to move beyond simply "shaming and blaming" and use more "people-centered" approaches (An-Na'im 2002). This would entail HROs establishing more long term relationships with domestic populations and working with them to better serve local needs.
Empirically, we utilize new events-based data on HRO activity and domestic nonviolent and violent protest against a state. These measures, created by the authors, allow us to capture our theoretical concepts with much greater accuracy than the previously utilized proxies. The protest activities data are employed alongside the well established Banks (2008) data and provide similar results. Future research studying HRO activities or domestic protest events will be well-served to utilize these new and more accurate events-based measures. 1972.21***(11) 1187.19***(11) 286.60***(10) 587.89***(10) Observations 1445 1455 1598 1598 Coefficients listed first, followed by robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed) All independent variables lagged one year (it-1) 1961.59***(11) 1096.69***(11) 300.48***(10) 522.82***(10) Observations 1231 1241 1473 1472 Coefficients listed first, followed by robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed) All independent variables lagged one year (it-1)
